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Abstract 
 
The dark web and the proliferation of criminals who have exploited its cryptographic protocols to 
commit crimes anonymously has created major challenges for law enforcement around the world. 
Traditional policing techniques have required amendment and new techniques have been developed 
to break the dark web’s use of encryption.  As with all new technology, the law has been slow to 
catch up and police have historically needed to use legislation which was not designed with the 
available technology in mind. This paper discusses the tools and techniques police use to investigate 
and prosecute criminals operating on the dark web in the UK and the legal framework in which they 
are deployed. There are two specific areas which are examined in depth: the use of covert policing 
and hacking tools, known in the UK as equipment interference. The operation of these investigatory 
methods within the context of dark web investigations has not previously been considered in UK 
literature, although this has received greater analysis in the United States and Australia.  The 
effectiveness of UK investigatory powers in the investigation of crimes committed on the dark web 
are analysed and recommendations are made in relation to both the law and the relevant Codes of 
Practice. The article concludes that whilst the UK has recently introduced legislation which 
adequately sets out the powers police can use during online covert operations and when hacking, 
the Codes of Practice need to specifically address the role these investigative tools play in dark web 
investigations. Highlighted as areas of particular concern are the risks of jurisdiction forum shopping 
and hacking overseas. Recommendations are made for reform of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
to ensure clarity as to when equipment interference can be used to search equipment when the 
location of that equipment is unknown.  
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Introduction 
 
Originally created by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory to provide a means for military units and 
field agents to communicate online without being identified and tracked, the dark web1  is a global 
network of computers that use a cryptographic protocol to communicate, enabling users to conduct 
transactions anonymously without revealing their location. You need easily obtained specialised 
anonymity software to access the dark web.  The most commonly used software is The Onion Router 
Project (or Tor).2 Strong encryption and anonymity protocols ensure that the IP addresses of the 
servers that run these sites remain hidden so that the authorities cannot easily identify who is using 
them, even if they manage to identify an illegal website and place it under surveillance. Whilst it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent of offending on the dark web, a 2014 study found the most common 
type of content requested by those using hidden services via Tor was child pornography followed by 
black marketplaces.3 Researcher at King’s College London found that 57% of the hidden-services 
websites within the Tor network facilitate criminal activity, including drugs, illicit finance and 
 
1 Also known as darknet as popularised by U.S. literature such as; Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado 
and Bryan Willman, ‘The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution’, ACM Workshop on Digital Rights 
Management, 18 November 2002, p. 54, https://crypto. stanford.edu/DRM2002/prog.html <last accessed 24 
May 2020> 
2 To access the anonymous sites of the Deep Web, visitors must use a TOR (The Onion Router) browser 
available at https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en  to access websites with the “.onion” 
domain 
3 Owen, Gareth and Nick Savage, ‘The Tor Dark Net’ (2015) Global Commission for Internet Governance, Paper 
Series No. 20. 
pornography involving violence, children and animals.4  A dark web marketplace or crypto-market is 
a website operating as a black market selling primarily illegal goods such as drugs, weapons, 
counterfeit currency, stolen credit card details, forged documents and unlicensed or counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals. Such marketplaces are characterised by their use of dark web anonymised access, 
bitcoin payment, and vendor feedback systems modelled on those found on eBay. Once an order has 
been placed, the buyer transfers the correct amount of Bitcoins to an escrow account, an electronic 
wallet controlled by the administrator of the web market. When the buyer receives the product, 
usually through the post, the buyer then notifies the administrator who can release the money to 
the vendor.  
  
In contrast to surface web browsers, the Tor browser allows users to connect to web pages 
anonymously by bouncing connections randomly between Tor nodes to obfuscate the IP address of 
the end user. The anonymity Tor provides makes it an attractive tool for users who wish to engage in 
illegal activities. Tor software’s use of a worldwide volunteer network of relays aims to prevent 
websites (and Law enforcement) from tracking users and therefore allows users to share information 
over public networks without compromising privacy. Using the Tor browser ‘[t]he sender of a piece 
of traffic will find an entry point and choose a random routing path through a selection of relays to 
obfuscate their point of origin. Traffic routed along this path will be encrypted until it leaves the last 
relay, to be sent to a specific IP address on the public Internet.’5  In the early part of the last decade 
the Tor system was described as ‘so effective that it makes the mass surveillance of ordinary 
individuals impossible, even if the NSA or local police wanted to try.’6 Even in 2016 it was argued 
that there were clear ‘legal and technological gaps that exist in law enforcement’s ability to cope 
 
4 Daniel Moore and Thomas Rid, 'Cryptopolitik and the Darknet' [2016] 58(1) Survival 7-38 
5 Danny Bradbury, ‘Unveiling the Dark Web’ (2014) 4 Network Security 14 
6 lain Gillespie, Cyber Cops Probe the Deep Web, SYDNEY MORNING HEROLD (Oct. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-news/cyber-copsprobe-the-deep-web-20131023-2vzqp.html  
<last accessed March 18 2020> 
with and respond to electronic and cyber-crime.’7  The general consensus in the early part of the 
millennium was that policing of the dark web was almost impossible due to ‘randomness, anonymity 
and encryption.’8   
However in the UK, as in most other western jurisdictions the police service were ‘acutely aware of 
the large and growing problem of cybercrime and [were] actively working … nationally and 
internationally along with the private sector to combat criminality on the web.’9 As the use of the 
dark web to commit crime grew exponentially, so did the abilities of Law Enforcement Agencies 
(LEAs) and cybercrime ascended LEAs’ agendas across the world.10 Neither cybercrime nor the dark 
web is a threat the UK has been taking lightly. In 2016, the UK launched a 5-year National Cyber 
Security Strategy that included £1.9 billion of investment and established the National Cyber Security 
Centre.11 The UK government also launched the £13.5 million Cyber Innovation Centre in London to 
help enhance the UK’s global reputation in cybersecurity. The UK aims to have a dedicated 
cybercrime unit in every police force in England and Wales in addition to a national training 
programme for police, sponsored by the National Police Chiefs Council. This is not just a UK response 
but a worldwide police response with Europol creating the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in 
2013. Specific dark web responses are slower but can now be seen. In 2015 the UK announced a 
dedicated unit for tackling dark web crime called ‘Joint Operations Cell’ or JOC. This is a joint, co-
located initiative between the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) which initially is to focus on child sexual exploitation and is aimed at ensuring 
‘no part of the internet, including the dark web, can be used with impunity by criminals to conduct 
 
7 Senya Merchant, COPS office, How the Web Presents New Challenges for Law Enforcement Agencies, Jan. 
2014  
8 Taylor Armerding, ‘To Shine a Light on Cybercrime’, Go Dark, 10 August 2015 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2960728/to-shine-a-light-on-cybercrime-go-dark.html <last accessed 
March 18 2020> 
9 Adrian Goldberg, The Dark Web: Guns and Drugs for Sale on the Internet's Secret Black Market, BBC news 
(Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-16801382  <last accessed March 18 2020>  
10 David Wall and Matthew Williams, ‘Policing Cybercrime: networked and social media etchnologies and the 
challenges for policing’ (2013) 24(4) Policing and Society 409-412 
11 National Cyber Security Centre, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-ncsc/what-we-do <last accessed 
March 18 2020> 
their illegal acts.’12 In 2018 Europol created its own dedicated dark web team13 and the US Justice 
Department created the Joint Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement Team known as J-Code.14 
 
This paper discusses the tools and techniques police use to investigate and prosecute criminals 
operating on the dark web. The first part of the article briefly considers investigative techniques 
which are traditional in nature but have proved effective in dark web investigations. The second part 
of the article considers two techniques in much more depth: the use of covert policing and hacking 
tools. The use of these techniques within the context of dark web investigations has not previously 
been considered in UK literature although this has received greater analysis in the United States and 
Australia.  Both techniques are considered from the UK perspective and the law which governs their 
use is set out. The aim of this article is to consider the effectiveness of UK investigatory powers in 
the context of investigations of crimes committed on the dark web. This is an area of policing which 
receives very little consideration but is of growing importance. By shining a light on this little 
understood corner of policing the legal framework UK police must operate within is analysed and 
recommendations are made for reform.  
 
 
Policing the dark web  
 
 
12 GCHQ, https://www.gchq.gov.uk/news/gchq-and-nca-join-forces-ensure-no-hiding-place-online-criminals 
<last accessed March 18 2020> 
13 Europol, https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/crime-dark-web-law-enforcement-coordination-
only-cure <last accessed March 18 2020> 
14 United States Department of Justice, Press Release: 18-110 (19 April 2020) 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-new-tool-fight-online-drug-trafficking 
<last accessed March 18 2020> 
The first step in identifying a suspect online is to trace the Internet Protocol (IP) address. This is not 
possible when an individual has accessed a site through a dark web browser such as Tor. A user 
needs no specialist knowledge or equipment to download or access sites using Tor so with a 
minimum level of technical expertise any individual with a computer and access to the internet can 
become unidentifiable to LEAs who are using traditional investigative techniques to unmask a user’s 
IP address. Most LEAs and the UK’s intelligence and security communities remain understandably 
secretive in relation to the tools and techniques used to unmask dark web criminals.  Whilst there is 
no definitive list of all policing techniques used to investigate crimes committed on the dark web it is 
possible from publicly available information to see which techniques are most often used.   Whilst 
the dark web has historically been portrayed as a space beyond the reach of law enforcement, 
where criminals are protected by a veil of technological anonymity, this is no longer the reality.  
Police all over the world, including the UK, have deployed a wide array of different techniques to 
identify, arrest and convict drug dealers, weapon buyers, child pornographers, terrorists and other 
criminals.15  
 
One of the most commonly used policing techniques in all cyber investigations, including those on 
the dark web is the use of Open Source Intelligence. OSINT is data and information that is collected 
legally from open and publicly available resources. Obtaining the information doesn’t require any 
type of clandestine effort and it is retrieved in a manner that is legal and meets copyright 
requirements. There are a wide range of OSINT tools available, some of which are specific to the 
dark web.16  OSINT sources require police officers to scour the web for breadcrumbs of information 
which lead to unmasking identities usually left through human error. This can come from forum 
posts in web-based communities, user generated contact, social networking sites, wikis, blogs and 
 
15 Joseph Cox, Motherboard (26 June 2016) https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vv73pj/7-ways-the-cops-will-
bust-you-on-the-dark-web <last accessed March 18 2020> 
16 Jake Creps (16 May 2019) https://jakecreps.com/2019/05/16/osint-tools-for-the-dark-web/ <last accessed 
March 18 2020> 
news sources, amongst others.  The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office 2018 annual report 
noted that ‘internal oversight of open source activity was inadequate’ and the IPCO expected to see 
improvement by the next inspection.17 Poor recording of OSINT activity can lead to problems in 
complying with disclosure in a subsequent prosecution and/or a failure to recognise when activity 
requires a directed surveillance authorisation, as discussed below. Cybercriminals must find a 
balance between masking their identity in order to evade law enforcement and leaving part of their 
identity unmasked in order to attract potential criminal collaborators and ‘customers’.18 Jonathan 
Lusthaus has detailed the tensions inherent in developing an online identity which require criminals 
to ‘attempt to pierce the veil of anonymity that the internet affords them, but not discard it 
entirely’.19 The more notorious an online moniker or pseudonym becomes the more profitable their 
illegal enterprises are likely to be but conversely the more likely it is that they will attract the 
attention of law enforcement agencies.  One of the largest dark web marketplaces, Silk Road was 
ultimately taken down as a result of open source information. The Silk Road in its very early stage 
had been advertised on a bitcoin forum using a personally identifiable email address. This led to the 
arrest and ultimately successful prosecution of Ross Ulbricht known by the pseudonym Dread Pirate 
Roberts in the United States.20 He was given five concurrent sentences including two of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.21 Another prolific dark web drug dealer, David Ryan 
Burchard, was arrested after he tried to trademark his dark web brand ‘caliconnect’ in his own 
name.22 This case demonstrates that online identities are effectively the brand of a cybercriminal. It 
is the foundation of their reputation and therefore there is an incentive to maintain that identity or a 
 
17 IPCO 2018 at [11.28 – 11,29] 
18 Jonathan Lusthaus, 'Trust in the World of Cybercrime' [2012] 13(2) Global Crime 71-94 
19 Jonathan Lusthaus, Industry of Anonymity: Inside the Business of Cybercrime (1st ed, Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts, 2018) pg 106 
20 Donna Leinwand Leger, USA Today, 15 May 2014 How the FBI brought down Cyber-underworld site Silk 
Road, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/fbi-cracks-silk-road/2984921/ <last accessed 
March 18 2020> 
21 Andy Greenbery, WIRED (31 May 2017) https://www.wired.com/2017/05/silk-road-creator-ross-ulbricht-
loses-life-sentence-appeal/ <last accessed March 18 2020> 
22 Joseph Cox, Motherboard (30 March 2016) https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9a3a4d/suspected-dark-
web-vendor-charged-after-trying-to-trademark-his-brand-caliconnect <last accessed March 18 2020> 
close variation of it - a fact which LEAs can use to their advantage. A second, closely related 
technique is the interrogation of seized data. Successful arrest or seizure of a dark web marketplace 
can generate additional leads for police investigators. The German drugs vendor ‘Shiny Flakes’ for 
example had kept a spreadsheet of all customer orders which was used by police to track down his 
buyers.23  Thirdly, despite the use of Bitcoin transactions to purchase items bought on the dark web 
it is still possible for authorities to track buyers and sellers ‘[b]y examining the pattern of 
transactions, the authorities may be able to tie a Bitcoin transaction to a real-world identity.’24 David 
Burchard was initially investigated because of his sale of millions of dollars of bitcoin to an 
unlicensed currency exchange.25 Blockchain evidence was present at the trial of Shaun Bridges, a U.S. 
secret agent who stole $820,000 worth of bitcoin while investigating the Silk Road. At the trial, 
prosecutors presented a diagram which mapped out how thousands of bitcoins were funnelled from 
Silk Road into a Mt Gox account which belonged to Shaun Bridges, allowing police to follow wire 
transfers to a company created by him. Finally, no matter how sophisticated your encryption, if you 
are dealing in physical goods, such as drugs or guns, offenders have to have some sort of delivery 
system. This is the point at which goods can be intercepted and potentially seized by customs 
officials. Law Enforcement may then set up surveillance to monitor who is picking up or posting such 
items or make a controlled delivery. 
 
Going undercover on the dark web 
  
 
23 Unknown, Accused Shiny Flakes Customer: “Everyone Could Use My Address” (02 August 2017) 
https://thebitcoinnews.com/accused-shiny-flakes-customer-everyone-could-use-my-address/ <last accessed 
18 March 2020> 
24 Timothy lee, The dark web: what it is, how it works, and why it’s not going away (31 December 2014) 
https://www.vox.com/2014/12/31/7470965/dark-web-explained <last accessed 18 March 2020>  
25 Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Press release (29 March 2016) https://www.justice.gov/usao-
edca/pr/merced-man-arrested-distributing-marijuana-and-cocaine-nationwide-through-silk-road-and <last 
accessed March 18 2020> 
Undercover policing is certainly not a new or novel method of policing and online undercover 
policing has also been used for some time in cyber investigations. However, the ability of police to 
infiltrate online forums in order to obtain evidence required for a successful prosecution is essential 
when tracking anonymous users on the dark web.26 Infiltrating online forums requires police to 
establish a controlled surveillance operation in which officers covertly act as administrators or 
moderators of illicit forums.27 Online undercover operations require a significant degree of skill as 
officers must learn to mimic the patterns and style of online personas they are impersonating and 
this represents a significant investment of time and resources for LEAs. One of the main priorities of 
undercover LEAs is investigating chat rooms, newsgroups, and peer-to-peer networks. Agents enter 
forums posing as offenders requesting images from others, or they enter groups posing as children 
to lure out the paedophiles in the group.  
 
Such operations have been very successful. For example, in the U.S. a LEA covertly took over the 
account of a staff member on the Silk Road and continued to work undercover whilst the site was 
taken over by police. Maintaining cover during this period enabled the officer to be invited to 
participate in the creation of the second Silk Road.   Another dark web marketplace, Hansa, was one 
of the largest dark web markets in Europe. During Operation Bayonet, the Netherland National High-
Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) installed network monitoring equipment which eventually led them to the 
Tor protected server that ran Hansa. Instead of shutting the site down as had been done before they 
chose to continue to operate the site for one month with officers posing as the administrator of the 
site. At the same time, the FBI located one of the servers of Alphabay, one of the largest dark web 
drug markets in the world. NHTCU timed their takeover of Hansa to coincide with the FBI take down 
of Alphabay. This resulted in 5000 users a day flocking from Alphabay to Hansa all of whom fell 
 
26 Elizabeth Joh, 'Breaking the law to enforce it: Undercover police participation in crime' [2009] 62(1) Stanford 
law Review 239-273 
27 Jonathan Lusthaus, 'Trust in the World of Cybercrime' [2012] 13(2) Global Crime 71-94 
under surveillance. Over 27 days NHTCU collected information on over 27,000 transactions and 
obtained data on 420,000 users including 10,000 home addresses.28  
 
In order to maintain an effective undercover operation officers are required to gain and maintain 
trust. That officers are not allowed (or empowered) to perform criminal acts is recognised by 
criminals as an effective signal of an undercover operation. This equally applies to online undercover 
operations. Lusthaus describes criminal acts as an important step in validating online identity 
amongst cybercriminals.29 The example of DarkMarket is given. The site required prospective 
members to provide details of 100 compromised credit cards, which would then be tested by two 
reviewers who would report on whether the individual should be trusted to join the organisation. A 
controversial aspect of undercover work surrounds the extent to which an undercover officer can 
engage in activity that would otherwise be illegal. Before turning to the way such operations are 
regulated in the UK it is helpful to discuss the high-profile Australian police unit called Taskforce 
Argos. The regulations governing the use of police powers differ between Australian states which are 
each their own jurisdiction. The state of Queensland has more expansive powers in relation to covert 
intelligence gathering operations than other states and indeed most western jurisdictions. The Police 
Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 allows Queensland officers to apply to the courts for 
permission to commit criminal offences in the course of an investigation. Taskforce Argos can 
petition the court to allow officers to disseminate child exploitation material during online covert 
operations in order to maintain cover. According to Bleakley:  
the Queensland child exploitation unit has become an integral participant in many 
multinational investigations conducted into the supply of child exploitation material on the 
Dark Web; its position at the centre of several major covert operations makes Taskforce 
 
28 Andy Greenbery, WIRED (03 August 2018) https://www.wired.com/story/hansa-dutch-police-sting-
operation/ <last accessed 18 March 2020>  
29 Jonathan Lusthaus, 'Trust in the World of Cybercrime' [2012] 13(2) Global Crime 71-94 
Argos the perfect framework through which it is possible to understand the implications of 
using covert tactics when investigating potential criminal offences in a digital environment.30 
Taskforce Argos’s involvement in overseas operations is well documented and long standing. They 
were involved in collaboration with the FBI in 2006 during Operation Achilles and with the Canadian 
police in 2014 during Operation Rhodes. In 2016 Operation Artemis focused on two interconnected 
child exploitation forums on the dark web: Giftbox Exchange and Child’s Play. This operation was 
initially run in conjunction with an unspecified European law enforcement partner and led to the 
arrest of Patrick Falte and Benjamin Faulkner in the United States. Law enforcement were able to 
obtain the passwords for Child’s Play from Faulkner which were then passed on to Taskforce Argos 
who took over as administrator of the site. In order to maintain cover, police had to post a monthly 
status update which had to include an image of child exploitation to ‘prove’ to members that the site 
was not compromised. This activity would not have been legal in the U.S. and therefore police had to 
collaborate with Taskforce Argos in Australia. The site was operated for 11 months before shutting 
down but the operation successfully identified 90 primary targets worldwide and over 900 users.31 
The ability to act across jurisdictional borders, anywhere in the world, is given to Queensland police 
under the provisions governing controlled operations in the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 
2000; there is no  condition in this act that officers must reasonably believe an offence is being 
committed or will be committed in Queensland, giving specialist teams like Taskforce Argos the 
authority to act outside of its jurisdiction in ‘a loosely-defined range of situations’.32 
Forum shopping is a term applied when multiple courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a 
claimant’s claim, with a claimant choosing to bring a claim in the most favourable jurisdiction. Whilst 
forum shopping is usually associated with civil cases it is a term which can be applied in relation to 
 
30 Paul Bleakley, 'Watching the watchers: Taskforce Argos and the evidentiary issues involved with infiltrating 
Dark Web child exploitation networks ' [2019] 92(3) The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 221-236 
31 Hoydal, HF, Stangvik, OS, Hansen, NR, Breaking the Dark Net: Why the police share abuse pics to save 
children. VG (07 October 2017) Available at: www.vg.no/spesial/2017/undercover-darkweb/ <last accessed 18 
March 2020> 
32 Paul Bleakley, 'Watching the watchers: Taskforce Argos and the evidentiary issues involved with infiltrating 
Dark Web child exploitation networks ' [2019] 92(3) The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 221-236 
prosecution form shopping. In this scenario, in a case of concurrent jurisdiction prosecutors choose 
to proceed to prosecution in a jurisdiction with favourable rules of evidence or a harsher sentencing 
regime.33  It should be noted that there are a range of national and bilateral guidelines applicable in 
cases of concurrent jurisdiction which aim to ensure prosecutions occur in the most appropriate 
jurisdiction, usually defined as where most of the harm or most of the offending occurred.34 A term 
more aptly applied to Taskforce Argos’s significant involvement with overseas operations is 
‘jurisdiction forum shopping’. In this scenario LEAs seek to move their investigation in order to take 
advantage of the laws of another jurisdiction which are favourable to their investigation. At its 
extreme, as seen in Operation Artemis, this can be used to move an investigation to a jurisdiction 
which will allow an investigative technique which would be unlawful in the originating jurisdiction. 
When dealing with offending occurring through the dark web this would in no way impact on the 
originating state’s ability to prosecute as it is likely that harm will (also) have occurred in that state 
and that concurrent jurisdiction is therefore held by multiple countries.  This is a phenomenon which 
has received very little critical analysis either by academics or LEAs.35 Such operations have been 
described as falling into a ‘gray area’ which could be ‘considered a collaborative partnership or a 
case of jurisdictional forum shopping by international law enforcement agencies’.  Bleakley, an 
Australian academic, states that ‘the collaborative partnerships that exist between Taskforce Argos 
and its international counterparts indicates that a lack of clearly-defined sovereignty has in fact 
proven beneficial in the pursuit of online child exploitation networks.’ Despite this he argues that 
‘good faith’ principles can be applied to allow for the evidence to be used by international 
partners.36  
 
33 Frank Zimmermann, 'Conflicts of Criminal Jurisdiction in the European Union' [2015] 3(1) Bergen Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1-21 
34 Paul Arnell and Gemma Davies. ‘The Forum Bar in UK Extradition Law: an Unnecessary Failure’ [2020] 
forthcoming, The Journal of Criminal Law  
35 There is a brief discussion of this concept in: Trine Thygesen Vendius, ‘Proactive Undercover Policing and 
Sexual Crimes against Children on the Internet’ [2015] 2(2) European Review of Organised Crime 6-24 and Paul 
Bleakley, 'Watching the watchers: Taskforce Argos and the evidentiary issues involved with infiltrating Dark 
Web child exploitation networks ' [2019] 92(3) The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 221-236 
36 Bleakley ibid. 
 Whilst there is no evidence that UK LEAs have ever participated in jurisdiction forum shopping, 
defined as purposefully collaborating with an overseas LEA as a way of circumventing national rules 
relating to the conduct of an investigation, UK convictions have resulted from Operation Artemis. In 
December 2014 Richard Huckle, a UK citizen living in Malaysia, was arrested at Gatwick airport and 
subsequently sentenced to a minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment for 71 offences which included 
rape against children aged between six months and 12 years between 2006 and 201437.  Evidence 
against Huckle was collected by Taskforce Argos and passed to the National Crime Agency.38  Other 
high-profile UK prosecutions also reveal cooperation between UK police and LEAs outside the UK. 
Matthew Falder was convicted in the UK of 135 sexual offences in October 2017 but was initially 
identified by the FBI in August 2013 during an operation which saw them build their own website on 
the servers which hosted illegal sites to track what was being said and done on them. In doing so 
they accessed the website ‘Hurt 2 The Core’ where amongst images of rape, murder, sadism, 
torture, paedophilia, blackmail and humiliation a user posted a blackmail picture of a teenage girl 
who was tracked to posts on a classified advertisement website on the clear web. At the same time 
one of Falder’s pseudonyms also came to the attention of the NCA in the UK. A special task force was 
set up involving the NCA, GCHQ, Homeland Security in the US, the Australian Federal Police and 
Europol with help from law enforcement in Israel and Slovenia to ‘enhance evidence gathering 
against the suspect’39.  Exactly what is meant by this phrase is not clear and potential issues relating 
to disclosure could arise.40 Similar transnational operations have also been used to convict drug 
offenders.  In 2018, a group of University of Manchester students led by Basil Assaf were jailed for 
 
37 Karen McVeigh, The Guardian, Richard Huckle given 22 life sentences for abuse of Malaysian children (06 
June 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/06/richard-huckle-given-23-life-sentences-for-
abusing-malaysian-children <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
38 Michael Safi, The Guardian, The Takeover: how police ended up running a paedophile site (13 July 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jul/13/shining-a-light-on-the-dark-web-how-the-police-ended-
up-running-a-paedophile-site <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
39 Jessica Labhard, BBC, Matthew Falder: How global taskforce caught Birmingham paedophile 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-42921977 <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
40 Chrisje Brants, Adam Jackson and Tim Wilson, A comparative Analysis of Anglo-Dutch approaches to “cyber 
policing”:  checks and balances fit for purpose? In this special edition 
up to 15 years and three months for selling £800,000 worth of drugs on the Silk Road. Information 
relating to their arrest is presumed to have come from the FBI as their arrest coincided with the day 
the FBI shut down the Silk Road in October 2013.41 
 
What if UK police did engage in jurisdiction forum shopping and the admission of evidence obtained 
was subsequently challenged in a UK court? Such a discussion must be theoretical as no such case 
has come before UK courts. Bleakley opined that the use of evidence obtained by Taskforce Argos 
and then passed to and used for prosecution purposes by a foreign LEAs could have significant 
ramifications and ‘result in putting children at a greater level of risk caused by criminal trials being 
thrown out.’42 To what extent is that an accurate representation of the law in the UK? There are two 
ways of looking at this question. Firstly, the approach of the courts to excluding evidence on the 
grounds of fairness and secondly the approach of the courts to staying proceedings on the grounds 
of abuse of process.43 Turning to the former, the approach to unlawfully obtained evidence in 
England and Wales is that such evidence is prima facia admissible but is subject to exclusion on the 
grounds of fairness through the general discretion to exclude prosecution evidence found in section 
78 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This states that in any proceedings the court may: 
refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely if it appears to the court 
that, having regard to all of the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.  
Deliberately taking over the running of an existing illegal site for the purpose of monitoring users 
who are then brought under surveillance would be unlikely to result in the exclusion of that 
 
41 Josh Halliday, Manchester students jailed for selling £800k of drugs on dark web, The Guardian (21 March 
2018) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/manchester-students-jailed-selling-800k-drugs-
dark-web <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
42 Bleakley, n.32 
43 See Brants, Jackson and Wilson n.40 
evidence in the UK. It seems therefore also likely that using such evidence obtained from an 
overseas LEA would also not result in exclusion.  This approach is confirmed by the case of Khan44 
where the trial court declined to exclude evidence obtained by police use of a secret listening device 
even though at the time there was no statutory code to govern the use of such covert surveillance. 
The case eventually made its way to the European Court of Human Rights which held that this did 
not constitute a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human rights as the central 
question was whether the proceedings ‘as a whole’ were fair.45  
 
A second possible argument would be to request a stay of proceedings for abuse of process possibly 
on the grounds that the continued operation of the website/forum amounted to state entrapment. 
The main authority in England on state entrapment is R v Looseley46 where Lord Nicholls confirmed 
that the main remedy for state entrapment cases was the granting of a stay under the abuse of 
process doctrine.47 The test however is set very high and requires ‘the involvement of the court in 
the conviction of the defendant … would compromise the integrity of the judicial system’, be ‘an 
affront to the public conscience’ and thus bring ‘the administration of justice into disrepute’.48 
Whilst the court would take into account the nature of the offence and the reason for the operation 
it would appear that in the absence of bad faith such an application would be unlikely to be 
successful.49  
 
 
44 Khan v the United Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 45 
45 Ibid at [38]  “The Court notes that at each level of jurisdiction the domestic courts assessed the effect of 
admission of the evidence on the fairness of the trial by reference to section 78 of PACE, and the courts 
discussed, amongst other matters, the non-statutory basis for the surveillance. The fact that the applicant was 
at each step unsuccessful makes no difference.” 
46 R v Looseley, AG’s reference (no 3 of 2000) [2001] UKHL 53 
47 This was reaffirmed in the case of R v Latif [1996] 1 ALL ER 353 (HL) 
48 Looseley n 46 at [31] (Lord Hoffmann) 
49 Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Paedophile hunters: how should the law respond?’ (2010) 12 Crim. L.R. 1016-1034 
The question that follows from this assessment is whether it would ever be appropriate for UK LEAs 
to engage in jurisdiction forum shopping in light of jurisprudence which suggests that such evidence 
would not be excluded by UK courts.  This paper argues that jurisdiction forum shopping is not a 
tactic which is legitimate, even if it is not unlawful. If the UK legislature has decided, on democratic 
principles, to circumscribe police powers it is difficult to see how it could ever be appropriate for a 
LEA to circumvent this by moving part of an investigation ‘off shore’ so that they can benefit from a 
more permissive investigatory powers.  Whilst collaboration with LEAs outside of the UK is a 
necessary part of investigating dark web crimes where networks inevitably stretch across borders, 
such engagement should be clearly on the basis of good faith. Whilst UK police have a duty to act on 
intelligence which is passed to them from overseas LEAs and collaborative operations may become 
necessary when an investigation is of interest to LEAs in multiple countries, they should not seek to 
obtain evidence by asking a foreign LEA to undertake investigations as a means of evading 
safeguards which apply under English law.  It would not be justifiable for UK police to use Taskforce 
Argos in the way the FBI seem to have done. To deliberately seek the help of police in another 
jurisdiction, not because the crime had links to that jurisdiction, but because police can use 
investigation tactics which are not available in the UK, would entirely circumvent the 2000 Act and 
undoubtedly undermine confidence in UK policing. There is no evidence that any UK LEA has 
engaged or would engage in such conduct. However for the purposes of clarity and trust in UK 
policing the relevant Codes of Practice should be amended to explicitly state that such a practice is 
not permissible.50 Such an inclusion would not only help to clarify the position for those in LEAs but 
would offer an additional level of protection to UK citizens who fall foul of jurisdiction forum 
shopping. Whilst a breach of the Code of Practice would not result in a successful application to stay 
proceedings or a successful application to exclude evidence under section 78 of PACE per se, it 
would likely be considered by the courts as akin to a breach of the PACE Codes of Practice. In the 
 
50 See below n [64] for discussion of concerns relating to UK police undercover operations which highlight the 
importance of  comprehensive oversight of undercover operations 
Court of Appeal decision of R v King51 the court, whilst denying the appeal, acknowledged that a 
deliberate breach of the PACE Codes of Practice is capable of rendering inadmissible evidence 
obtained as a result of that breach although it would still depend on the factual circumstances of the 
case as to whether this amounted to unfairness. 
 
Whilst UK police have shared information with Taskforce Argos to what extent would the tactics 
used by the specialised unit be permissible in the UK? In the UK, if the study of an individual’s online 
presence becomes persistent then authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 (the 2000 Act) may be needed and officers should adhere to the associated Codes of Practice 
designed to ensure compliance with the European Convention of Human Rights, in particular Article 
8.52 Where online monitoring or investigation is conducted covertly for the purpose of a specific 
investigation or operation and is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a 
person or group, an authorisation for directed surveillance should be considered. Directed 
surveillance must be both proportionate and necessary. It is necessary if, amongst other things, it is 
‘for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or preventing disorder.’53   Where a person acting 
on behalf of a public authority is intending to engage with others online without disclosing his or her 
identity, a Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) authorisation may be needed.54  Section 27 of 
2000 Act states that conduct shall be lawful for all purposes if ‘an authorisation under [the Act] 
confers an entitlement to engage in that conduct on the person whose it is and his conduct is in 
 
51 R v King [2012] EWCA Crim 805 
52 Home Office, Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Code of Practice (August 2018) and  Covert 
Human Intelligence Sources Revised Code of Practice (August 2018), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covert-surveillance-and-covert-human-intelligence-sources-
codes-of-practice <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
53 Section 28(3) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000  
54 Such sources can be both in and outside of the UK. According to paragraph 4.10 of the Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources Revised Code of Practice (August 2018): members of foreign law enforcement or other 
agencies or CHIS of those agencies may be authorised under the 2000 Act in the UK in support of domestic and 
international investigations. When a member of a foreign law enforcement agency is authorised in support of 
a domestic or international investigation or operation the manual says that “consideration should be given to 
authorising the individual at the level prescribed by the 2013 Relevant Sources Order as if the individual holds 
an ‘office, rank or position’ with an organisation listed in the same Order.” 
accordance with the authorisation’. The legal limits of section 27 are therefore exceptionally wide 
and only circumscribed by the tests of necessity and proportionality. No further mention is made of 
section 27 in either of the Codes of Practice. It therefore appears that as a matter of law there is 
nothing which would prevent UK police officers from conducting an online undercover operation 
which could include the distribution of illegal pornography in order to maintain cover.  The only 
other publicly available document which provides any relevant guidance is the Undercover Police 
Guidance which is still in a draft format despite a consultation closing in 2016.55 The guidance 
acknowledges that whilst authorisations should make the parameters of undercover operatives 
conduct clear, it may be necessary to participate in the criminal activity about which they have been 
asked to report. The guidance states that the case of R v Looseley ‘has identified the limits of 
acceptable law enforcement conduct’ in relation to officers participating in criminal activity but that 
in addition officers should not engage in planning and committing the crimes, only play a minor role 
and participate only where essential.56 Online operations are only very briefly mentioned at the end 
of the document and no substantive aspect of online deployment is considered.57 
 
The failure to adequately address the needs of online undercover operations raises a number of key 
issues. Firstly, it is argued that the case of Looseley does not adequately deal with the parameters of 
section 27 as suggested by the draft Undercover Police Guidance. It instead sets out the principles to 
be considered by the court when invited to stay proceedings as an abuse of process on the grounds 
of state entrapment. Whilst conduct which would otherwise be criminal may form part of conduct 
said to amount to entrapment this is not an essential ingredient of entrapment. As such the case of 
Looseley does not work well for understanding the parameters of conduct which can be authorised 
under the Act notwithstanding that it would otherwise constitute a criminal offence. More 
 
55 Available at https://www.college.police.uk/News/College-news/Pages/undercover-policing-guide.aspx <last 
accessed 23 April 2020> 
56 Ibid paragraph 7.14.1 
57 Ibid paragraph 11.3 
specifically it is of limited use to officers trying to understand the legitimate parameters of online 
covert investigations more generally.58  The lack of attention given to undercover online operations 
in all policy and professional practice documents was noted in a 2014 HMIC report which concluded 
that police were hindered by there being no nationally agreed definition of undercover online 
officers, effective recognition of the role in key policy documents and insufficient training which 
addressed the specific problems associated with online deployment.59  The report also noted that 
only 25 out of 44 forces had a dedicated undercover online capability and forces seemed not to 
appreciate the importance of the extent of the cybercrime threat and the need to employ 
undercover online tactics to meet those challenges.60 This assessment accords with the research 
team’s experience during interviews and interactive workshops which revealed that whilst some 
undercover tactics are employed within the UK this is generally the reserve of the National Crime 
Agency and a few highly specialised teams. Online undercover operations are an underutilised tactic 
within the rest of UK policing. This is not because such tactics are circumscribed by the law but 
because of a lack of expertise, resources and clarity in policy and Code of Practice documents has 
resulted in an overly cautious approach by local cybercrime units.  
 
Between 1 October 2011 and 30 September 2013 there were 354 undercover online operations 
authorised in the UK.61 The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office produces an Annual Report 
which must include statistics on the use of the relevant investigatory powers. The report for 2018 
was published in early 2020 but does not differentiate between online and offline authorisations. 
The report sets out that the number of authorised CHIS has gradually declined over the last ten years 
 
58 Giollabhuí, Goold, and Loftus ‘Watching the watchers: conducting ethnographic research on covert police 
investigation in the United Kingdom’ (2016) 16(6) Qualitative Research 630-645 
59 HMIC, An Inspection of Undercover Policing in England and Wales (2014) available at 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/an-inspection-of-undercover-policing-
in-england-and-wales.pdf <last accessed 23 April 2020> 
60 Ibid at para [114] 
61 HMIC, An inspection of undercover policing in England and Wales (2014) ISBN: 978-1-78246-515-7, para [26] 
available at https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/an-inspection-of-
undercover-policing-in-england-and-wales.pdf <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
with only 124 CHIS authorisations granted to LEAs in 2018.62 There were however 6,108 directed 
surveillance warrants issued to LEAs although again there is no further break down of this number. 
Despite the overall decrease in the number of CHIS authorisations the IPCO 2018 Annual Report 
notes a ‘growth of online activity’ and that correspondingly LEAs have introduced a ‘range of training 
to allow staff to lawfully exploit this source of information’ although some agencies have been 
slower to build their online capabilities. It is important that the extent to which these powers are 
used to authorise online covert surveillance and the extent to which such operations permit officers 
to engage in activity which would otherwise be illegal is properly understood. The IPCO annual 
report should break down the figures so that the extent to which LEAs use the powers to authorise 
online undercover operations is known and the public can have confidence that these powers are 
monitored and effectively overseen. 
 
Undercover policing has been described as a “necessary evil” because of its potential for misuse. By 
their very nature, covert methods are subject to abuse and to the avoidance of accountability.63 In 
the UK a number of well publicised scandals relating to the conduct of officers whilst undercover64 
have resulted in a series of reviews including an ongoing Undercover Policing Inquiry.65 The nature of 
undercover policing (both online and offline) and the inevitable secrecy of its operation heightens 
the risk of misuse. When this is combined with a lack of recognition of online undercover 
investigations in policy and practice document, a lack of training and a seeming reticence to clearly 
set out boundaries for police engaged in such work the risks for officers and to public confidence are 
 
62 The report suggests this decline corresponds to a decline in available resources. 
63 Grabosky & Gregor, ‘Online Undercover Investigations and the Role of Private Third Parties’ (2019) 13(1) 
International Journal of Cyber Criminology 38-54 
64 HMIC, An Inspection of Undercover Policing in England and Wales (2014) There have been widespread 
concerns about undercover policing for a number of years. See paragraph 5 and 6 “Allegations that undercover 
officers have had sexual relationships with those who are linked with the target of their investigations, that 
they have given false evidence in court to maintain their undercover status, and that they have used the 
details of children who have died as their covert identities have all contributed to a growing unease that the 
tactic is being wrongly used, badly supervised, and ineffectively controlled.” 
65 Undercover Policing Inquiry available at https://www.ucpi.org.uk/about-the-inquiry/ <last accessed 18 
March 2020> 
manifest. There is no universally accepted approach in covert investigative methods used in active 
investigations of online child exploitation. Australian courts have taken a very liberal approach66 
whilst in New Zealand the Principles of Practice for Investigating on-Line Grooming of Children Under 
16 preclude the transmission of ‘objectionable images’.67 Joh argues from a U.S. perspective that 
‘authorised criminality’ is ‘secret, unaccountable, and in conflict with some of the basic premises of 
democratic policing’ and therefore undermines social support for the police.68 Alternatively 
academics such as Yar argue that the policing of sexual offences on the internet occupies an 
anomalous position as such crimes have a ‘higher hierarchy of standing’ in relation to other internet 
crimes as perceived in public, political and media consciousness.69 From a European perspective 
child exploitation is one of the three main priorities of Europols ‘European Cybercrime Centre’ (EC3). 
Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children further 
prescribes that the EU Member States shall ‘ensure that sexual offences against children are 
effectively investigated’. Vendius argues that undercover policing is a necessary investigative tool in 
order to detect and infiltrate child pornography networks.70 There are a number of  EU countries 
which allow for undercover online investigations to authorise police to act as a ‘participating 
offender’ in order to infiltrate an organisations which include Belgium and the Netherlands.  
Vendius’s research suggests that the UK does allow officers to share child pornography when 
necessary but one interviewee stated that ‘most senior officers would say no to the sending of 
images on the grounds of further victimisation rather than being illegal’.71 A decision as to whether 
such conduct is appropriate should not be made by individual officers but should have been clearly 
 
66 R v Stubbs [2009] ACTSC 63 (26 May 2009) 
67 New Zealand Police, Principles of Practice for Investigating On-Line Grooming of Children Under 16. 
Reproduced in R v Stubbs [2009] ACTSC 63 
68Elizabeth Joh, 'Breaking the law to enforce it: Undercover police participation in crime' [2009] 62(1) Stanford 
law Review 239-273. The article defines authorised criminality as ‘the practice of permitting covert police 
officers to engage in conduct that would be criminal outside of the context of the investigation’ 
69 Majid Yar, ‘The policing of Internet sex offences: pluralised governance versus hierarchies of standing’ (2013) 
23(4) Policing and Society 482-497 
70 Vendius, T. T. ‘Proactive Undercover Policing and Sexual Crimes against Children on the Internet’ (2015) 2(2) 
European Review of Organised Crime 
71 Ibid page 16 
considered at a national level and communicated to all officers engaged in undercover operations. 
Despite Vendius’s research the extent to which UK LEAs engage in conduct such as that seen by 
Taskforce Argos in Operation Artemis is unknown and therefore lacks transparency. As a minimum 
publicly available guidance for online undercover operatives is needed urgently. This is an issue 
which should sensibly form part of the ongoing Undercover Policing Inquiry. 
 
Law Enforcement Agencies use of hacking in a dark web context 
 
The dark web operates in a way which makes activity easy to see but the identity of those involved 
hard to reveal. In many instances, despite the use of various techniques described above, law 
enforcement agencies can observe dark web users committing crimes but cannot identify them for 
further investigation and prosecution without hacking72 into their computers.73 Such hacking 
constitutes a search, which means law enforcement must obtain authorisation beforehand. Law 
enforcement use of online hacking is referred to by different names in different jurisdictions. In the 
U.S. it is commonly described as Network Investigative Techniques (NITs) or Computer Exploitation. 
In the UK it is more commonly referred to as Equipment Interference as defined in the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016.  Such techniques are particularly needed in dark web investigations where 
suspects are using anonymising software such as Tor to obscure their location. The International 
Association of Chiefs of Police reports that LEAs are “not able to investigate illegal activity and 
prosecute criminals effectively without evidence collected using hacking techniques.”74 In order to 
 
72 European Parliament, Directorate-General For Internal Policy, Legal Frameworks for Hacking by law 
Enforcement: Identification. Evaluation and Comparison of Practice (2017). See page 8 “Although the term 
‘hacking’ is not used by law enforcement agencies, these practices essentially mirror the techniques used by 
hackers (i.e. exploiting any possible vulnerabilities – including technical, system and/or human vulnerabilities – 
within an information technology (IT) system)” 
73 Diana Benton, 'Seeking Warrants for Unknown Locations: The Mismatch between Digital Pegs and Territorial 
Holes' (2018) 68 Emory LJ 183 
74 IACP Summit Report,  Privacy and Public Safety: A Law Enforcement Perspective on the Challenges of 
Gathering Electronic Evidence (2015) 
unmask a device’s identifying information, which will lead to its physical location, and then 
potentially the user’s identity, LEAs use hacking tools which enable them to remotely access and 
install malware on a computer without its owners’ permission.75 Frequently this is done with the 
intention of accessing the target computer and converting it into a surveillance device thus 
circumventing the need to know a target’s location.  Once installed the malware can cause a 
computer to perform any task, even forcing it to covertly upload files to a server controlled by law 
enforcement or instruct the computer’s camera or microphone to collect sound and images.  
 
 A number of high-profile cases have documented LEAs use of hacking tools around the world. From 
a U.S. perspective during the investigation of Playpen, a child pornography site, the FBI deployed 
malware which once clicked by a user revealed their IP address.76 The operation ran for 13 days and  
harvested over 1000 IP addresses not only in the U.S. but all over the world.77 The National Security 
Agency (NSA) have also deployed a malware named EgotisticalGiraffe to infect users with malware if 
they download Tor through an outdated web browser allowing them to monitor a downloader's 
activity.78  In April 2017 a group called the Shadow Brokers released details of hacking tools alleged 
to be from the CIA that allow spying on money transfers.79 In 2016 the Australian authorities used a 
phishing attack to bypass Tor software as part of a child pornography investigation which allowed 
them to remotely hack a computer in Michigan.80 Information found through hacking has also been 
used in the UK. The Snowdon disclosures revealed that in 2011 GCHQ used a Distributed Denial of 
 
75 Ibid page [8] alternatives to hacking include “requiring users to provide their password or decrypt their data; 
requiring technology vendors and service providers to bypass the security of their own products and services; 
and the systematic weakening of encryption through the mandated introduction of ‘backdoors’ and/or 
weakened standards for encryption.” 
76 This is known as a ‘watering hole’ attack 
77 European Parliament, Directorate-General For Internal Policy, Legal Frameworks for Hacking by law 
Enforcement: Identification. Evaluation and Comparison of Practice (2017) at [126] 
78 BBC, NSA targeted Tor users via Firefox flaw, reports say (07 October 2013) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24429332  <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
79 Matt Burgess, Hacking the hackers: everything you need to know about Shadow Brokers’ attack on the NSA 
(18 April 2017) https://www.wired.co.uk/article/nsa-hacking-tools-stolen-hackers <last accessed 18 March 
2020>  
80 European Parliament, Directorate-General For Internal Policy, Legal Frameworks for Hacking by law 
Enforcement: Identification. Evaluation and Comparison of Practice (2017) 
Service (DDoS) attack against the hacktivist collective ‘Anonymous’.81  David Trail pleaded guilty to 
possession  with intent to supply diazepam and hacking credit card details after the CPS alleged that 
Trail had created Topix2, another dark web marketplace. The police investigation in the UK began 
when the FBI handed over a range of IP addresses linked to a number of sites. It was German police 
that identified Trail as the controller of a dark web marketplace which had its server in Germany.82 
 
The use of hacking tools in dark web cases, and in particular the jurisdictional problems that arise 
when applying for a warrant where the location of the device to be searched is unknown, has 
received much more attention in the U.S. than in other jurisdictions. This is in part because the 
federal nature of the U.S. brought problems relating to jurisdiction into sharp relief at an early stage 
and this generated a number of legal challenges concerning the point.  A brief consideration of the 
U.S. literature before moving to look at the UK legislation governing law enforcement hacking sets 
out the primary problems in relation to the use of law enforcement hacking in dark web 
investigations. Firstly, a search is considered to take place where the suspect’s computer is physically 
located not at the hacker’s location. In 2016 an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 
(rule 41) allowed a remote access warrant to be issued in a U.S. federal  court despite the court 
being unaware of the location of the device to be searched if the device’s location had been 
‘concealed through technological means’.  The amendment was designed to allow a warrant to be 
issued in one federal area even though the search would potentially be executed in another.  The 
amendment was not supposed to allow for warrants to be issued if they were to be executed 
outside the U.S.  However, when a warrant is issued for a device with a location ‘concealed through 
technological means’ there is no way of knowing whether the warrant will be executed within the 
U.S. or not. In a dark web investigation, the location of the computer will not be known until after 
 
81 BBC news, Snowden Leaks: GCHQ ‘attacked Anonymous’ hackers (05 February 2014) 
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82 John Connell, FBI helps catch Edinburgh man selling drugs on ‘dark web’ (28 May 2016) 
https://www.edinburghnews.scotsman.com/news/crime/fbi-helps-catch-edinburgh-man-selling-drugs-dark-
web-619244 <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
the search is conducted. The amendment to rule 41 was specifically needed because of the 
expansive use of the dark web for criminal enterprise83 and a number of high-profile rejections of 
warrants on the grounds of jurisdiction.84  
 
In a 2017 article, Ghappour argued that the use of hacking tools by law enforcement to pursue 
criminal suspects who have anonymised their communications on the dark web ‘presents a looming 
flashpoint between criminal procedure and international law’.  The reason for this is said to be the 
fact that the ‘practical realities of the technology underlying dark web investigations make it 
inevitable that foreign-located computers will be subject to remote ‘searches’ and ‘seizures’’85 as 
there is no guarantee that the data is located within the United States. He goes on to raise issues 
about how such cross-border searches are authorised and deployed and suggests that ‘the use of 
hacking tools profoundly disrupts the legal architecture on which cross-border criminal 
investigations rest.’86  Benton however does not agree with Ghappour’s conclusions in relation to 
jurisdiction. She argues that the answer to the jurisdictional conundrum is simply a further 
amendment to Rule 41 to specifically address the fact that a judge may issue a warrant for search 
and seizure of property outside of their jurisdiction as ‘no other district is known to have 
jurisdication and the district is reasonably likely to have jurisdiction over the crime underlying the 
probable cause in the warrant.’87 She argues that such an amendment would comply with 
constraints on extraterritorial jurisdiction and gives a list of examples as to when, in other 
circumstances, a state may criminalise extraterritorial conduct. The article comes to the conclusion 
that ‘when so many aspects of criminal investigation and prosecution already reach overseas, it is 
 
83 Benton n (73) 
84 In re Warrant to Search a Target Comp. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2013) 
("This is not to say that such a potent investigative technique [as remote access hacking] could never be 
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light of advancing computer search technology.").  
85 Ghappour, A., Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark Web, (2017)  69 
Stanford Law Review 1075 
86 Ibid. 
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odd that magistrate judges lack the requisite statutory authority and procedural mechanisms to 
issue search warrants for evidence that may be located abroad.’ Such a change in the rules would 
not prevent LEAs from coordinating with the relevant overseas jurisdication once the foreign nature 
of the search is realised as a way of reducing ‘conflict between sovereigns and to preserve comity’. 
Once a LEA learns that a computer they are searching is located overseas they:  
should cease further searching and determine whether the host nation requires further 
approval. At this stage sharing their investigation with host nation law enforcement agents 
may provide the best means of ensuring the suspect is prosecuted. Host nation authorities 
will have greater access to legal mechanisms to investigate the suspect, including gathering 
evidence on site, interviewing witnesses, and arresting the suspect.88 
Brown agrees with this assessment also arguing that ‘traditional notions of territoriality applied to 
physical evidence are increasingly irrelevant: when electronic evidence is involved and where a 
crime scene may well extend across multiple political borders’.89 
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (the 2016 Act) came into force in the UK in November 2016 and 
aimed to formalise law enforcement use of hacking techniques and ensure greater transparency and 
oversight. The Act permits law enforcement to obtain data from devices by interfering with the 
associated electronic equipment – this provision is labelled ‘equipment interference’ (EI) and is set 
out in Part 5 of the 2016 Act.90 The Act is accompanied by six Codes of Practice which outline the 
operational detail and judicial oversight arrangements which include the Equipment Interference 
Code.91  The warrant must be approved by the law enforcement chief and a Judicial Commissioner92 
 
88 ibid 
89 Steven David Brown, ‘Hacking for evidence: the risks and rewards of deploying malware in pursuit of justice’ 
(2020) 20 ERA Forum 423-435 
90 This capability is not new to law enforcement and would previously have been authorised as property 
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91Home Office, Equipment Interference Code of Practice (March 2018) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/715479/
Equipment_Interference_Code_of_Practice.pdf <last accessed 18 March 2020> 
92 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 s. 106(1)(d) 
unless the application is urgent,93 a provision referred to as the ‘double lock’. LEA’s EI warrants may 
authorise both physical interference (e.g. covertly downloading data from a device to which physical 
access has been gained) and remote interference (e.g. installing a piece of software on to a device 
over a wired and/or wireless network in order to remotely extract information from the device).94 
LEAs may be issued with a targeted EI warrant by the appropriate Law Enforcement Chief if the 
warrant is necessary and proportionate.95 A warrant can only be issued for the purposes of 
preventing or detecting ‘serious crime’96 or to prevent death or injury or damage to a person’s 
physical or mental health.97  There must be a British Islands connection meaning that at least some 
of the conduct, equipment interference or information must have occurred or is likely to occur in the 
British Islands98 at some point.99 Certain LEAs such as the National Crime Agency (NCA),  may be 
issued with targeted equipment interference warrants regardless of whether there is a British 
Islands connection. The code of practice says that ‘in practice, should a regional police force need to 
investigate crimes taking place where there is no British Islands connection they will do so with the 
assistance of another agency, such as the NCA.’ A targeted equipment interference warrant can be 
‘thematic’100 if it relates to multiple people, organisations or locations in the UK.101 The Equipment 
Interference Code of Practice states that ‘[no] interference should be considered proportionate if 
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99 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s.107 
100 See Code of Practice para [5.12] “Targeted thematic warrants can cover a wide range of activity; it is 
entirely possible for a thematic warrant to cover a wide geographical area or involve the acquisition of a 
significant volume of data, provided the strict criteria of the Act are met.”  
101 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 s. 101 
the information which is sought could reasonably be obtained by other less intrusive means.’102 
Warrants usually last for 6 months.103 The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) 2018 
annual report notes that ‘since implementation on 5 December 2018 we have seen a small number 
of applications to conduct EI.’104 It goes on to accept that because of the intrusive and technically 
complex nature of EI it has predominantly been used by the larger LEAs and the IPCO is satisfied  
that the power is being used appropriately.105 A total of 1,249 targeted equipment interference 
warrants were considered by a Judicial Commissioner in 2018.106 It is not possible to know  from the 
available statistics what proportion of these warrants were issued to LEAs.  
 
The legislation differentiates between targeted equipment interference and bulk equipment 
interference.107 Bulk equipment interference warrants are only available to the intelligence services 
and are approved by the Secretary of State. They are used internationally when the target or 
location is unknown and are used for the acquisition of communications and equipment data 
directly from computer equipment overseas.108 Historically, the type of data sought may have been 
available during its transmission through bulk interception. The growing use of encryption has made 
this more difficult and, in some cases, equipment interference may be the only option for obtaining 
crucial intelligence.  Warrants for these powers must not be sought with the intention of acquiring 
the communications or private data of people in the UK.109  In such cases a targeted equipment 
interference warrant would be needed. The 2016 Act also creates the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The IPC110 reviews the operation of the 2016 
 
102 See Code of Practice at [4.19]  
103 See Investigatory Powers Act 2016 s.117 for renewal of warrants 
104 At [11.41] 
105 Ibid 
106 Ibid at [18.4]. Note that the statistics for 2018 relate to a period of transition from authorisation under RIPA 
2000 to IPA 2016 and therefore the statistics might not reflect the totality of activity 
107 Set out in chapter 3 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
108 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s. 176 
109 Such warrants were previously governed by the Intelligence Services Act 1994.   
110 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s. 227 
Act which includes all equipment interference warrants by law enforcement to ensure that the law 
has been complied with and fundamental rights considered; the IPT is a judicial body, independent 
of the government111 which provides a right of redress for anyone who believes they have been a 
victim of unlawful action by a public authority using covert investigative techniques.112 This includes 
law enforcement use of equipment interference.113 
 
The operation of the 2016 Act in relation to warrants issued where the location of the device is 
concealed, as it is in many dark web cases, is opaque. On its face the Act only expressly permits 
hacking beyond the UK in very limited circumstances. Only bulk equipment interference warrants 
are specifically designed for searches overseas and they are only available to the intelligence 
services, not LEAs. Most LEAs114 are required to establish a British Islands connection for an 
equipment interference warrant. As has been established, the nature of anonymising technology 
means that it must surely be difficult in some cases  for law enforcement or intelligence agencies to 
know the physical location of the equipment they are hacking until the hacking has been conducted 
and the location of the target is revealed. In many dark web cases LEAs may well be unknowingly 
applying for a warrant to search a foreign computer.  This places LEAs in a catch-22 situation. This is 
important as the exponential growth of the dark web means that hacking techniques are 
increasingly a necessary part of dark web investigations.  
 
 
111 Comprising members of the judiciary and senior members of the legal profession 
112 Provides a right to appeal from decisions and determinations of the Tribunal when there is a point of law 
that raises an important point of principle or practice, or where there is some other compelling reason for 
allowing an appeal 
113 Further information can be found at https://www.ipt-uk.com/  
114 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s. 107. Also see Code of Practice at [3.28] “A law enforcement officer who is 
a member of a police force, the Ministry of Defence Police, the Police Investigations and Review 
Commissioner, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the British Transport Police or the Police 
Services of Scotland or Northern Ireland may only be issued with a targeted equipment interference warrant is 
the law enforcement chief considers there is a British Islands connection.’ 
The Code of Conduct also has very little to say on the jurisdictional limits of equipment interference 
warrants. However, there are two things to note. Firstly the parameters which define when a British 
Islands connection exits are exceptionally wide as it includes ‘any of the conduct authorised by the 
warrant would take place in the British Islands (regardless of the location of the equipment which 
would, or may be, interfered with).’115 An example is given of an intelligence service installing a piece 
of software on a device located outside the British Islands by means of conduct effected within the 
UK. In this example a British Islands connection is said to exist because the ‘conduct’ i.e. the hacking, 
takes place in the UK.116 Secondly, the Code states that  
to further ensure that equipment activities conducted by [specified law enforcement] 
agencies are focused on investigations or operations within the British Islands, irrespective 
of whether there is a British Islands connection, they are prohibited by the code from 
obtaining an equipment interference warrant for interferences that takes place outside of 
the British Islands unless the subject of investigation is a UK national, or is likely to become 
the subject of criminal or civil proceedings in the UK, or if the operation is likely to affect a 
UK national or give rise to material likely to be used in evidence before a UK court.  
 
The Code does recognise that other117 LEAs, which would primarily be the National Crime Agency 
and the intelligence services, may be issued with targeted equipment interference warrants 
regardless of whether there is a British Islands connection and can therefore undertake equipment 
interference outside of the UK. However, should a regional police force need to investigate crimes 
taking place where there is no British Islands connection, according to the Code of Practice, they 
would do so with the assistance of the NCA. The code makes only one tangential reference to dark 
 
115 Code of Practice at [3.28] 
116 In addition to this a British Isles connection exists if ‘any of the equipment would, or may be in the British 
Islands at some time’ or the purpose of the interference is to obtain communications or private information 
relating to a person ‘who is, or believed to be in the British Island.’ 
117 other than those set out in section 107(2) of the Act 
web investigations where an example of an investigation into a paedophile overseas struggles to 
name and locate the offender ‘due to anonymisation’. In such a case it is said that it may be 
necessary for the intelligence services to examine material obtained through bulk data in order to 
trace victims. This would seem sensible as it is recognised that encryption makes it harder to rely on 
techniques aimed at intercepting a suspect’s communication. Consequently, agencies need to make 
greater use of bulk data to identify information relating to offending.  
 
Whilst the 2016 Act has enabled the UK to become more transparent in the granting of powers to 
national security and law enforcement agencies to collect, access and use data a number of issues 
are still unresolved and there are several issues which need to be clearer in the Codes of Practice 
and/or could be addressed by the IPCO. Firstly, the overlap between bulk equipment interference 
and thematic targeted equipment interference means that both can be used as an effective 
alternative to interception when encryption would render interception useless. The advent of the 
dark web and the need to find an alternative method of obtaining information in an age of 
encryption has meant that security and intelligence agencies have begun to play a vital role in 
supporting law enforcement to tackle the threat of serious crime. In the Government’s own 
operational case for bulk powers it was noted that ‘bulk data had supported the disruption of over 
50 child sexual exploitation offenders in the UK’ over a 30 months period.118 These capabilities are 
particularly said to underpin the work of the Joint Operations Centre between GCHQ and law 
enforcement to fight child exploitation.119  Secondly, in light of the increasing usefulness of 
equipment interference in dark web cases the issues that those cases present in relation to 
obtaining clear evidence which links an offender or their offending to the UK before a warrant is 
issued must be considered.  As has been seen, academics have called for a fundamental rethink of 
 
118 UK Government, Operational Case for Bulk Powers at [3.14} available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504187/
Operational_Case_for_Bulk_Powers.pdf <last accessed on 18 March 2020> 
119 Ibid. See para [3.14} “The use of bulk data will remain essential for preventing parts of the internet from 
operating beyond the reach of law enforcement” 
the concept of jurisdiction in relation to the collection of digital evidence and the international 
approach to its resolution generally and in relation to dark web investigations.120 However despite 
the increasing importance of hacking tools in the investigation of serious crime brought about by the 
dark web neither the 2016 Act nor the Codes of Practice deals with the difficult issue of how 
warrants should be dealt with when the location of the computer to be searched is unknown and 
therefore potentially overseas. 
 
It is suggested that, in line with legislative amendments made in other countries, the 2016 Act 
should be amended to clarify the position in relation to the searching of equipment in unknown 
locations. It should be clear to those who read the Act and its accompanying code that equipment 
interference warrants can be issued despite the location of the device being unknown (and 
therefore potentially outside of the UK) if ‘the location of the device is concealed through 
technological means and there is evidence of a British Islands connection which justifies further 
investigation’. As Benton argues from a U.S. perspective,  
Federal judges should have the authority to issue warrants for the search or seizure of 
property under the Fourth Amendment if the alleged crime could be prosecuted in their 
district. This approach bridges the disconnect between courts' jurisdiction, based on physical 
spaces, and crimes that take place in cyberspace121.  
Such an amendment to the 2016 Act is in line with recent expanded notions of criminal jurisdiction 
in the field of electronic evidence.122 It would also provide clear statutory authority for issuing 
warrants for places unknown and would enable the law to bridge the ‘current disconnect between 
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05/2016, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698263 <last accessed on 18 March 2020> 
 121Benton n (73) 
122 Steven David Brown, ‘Hacking for evidence: the risks and rewards of deploying malware in pursuit of justice’ 
(2020) 20 ERA Forum 423-435 
territorial constraints on jurisdiction and the reality of modern cybercrime’.123 Such an approach is 
needed as it is clear that the traditional approach in England and Wales of considering anything 
which is not illegal to be lawful is not consistent with European Convention of Human Rights 
jurisprudence which requires a clear legal basis for interference with a right under Article 8. It is 
accepted that any amendment to the law would require careful consultation which could potential 
begin with a review by the IPCO. The ongoing debate surrounding the legitimacy and transparency of 
international hacking warrants has not only been happening in the U.S. but also in Australia and in 
Europe.124 A European Parliament study found that four out of six countries studied had adopted 
specific legislative provisions authorizing government hacking, and the remaining two were in the 
legislative process to enact such provisions.125 However, of the six countries studied, only the 
Netherlands legally permitted the hacking of devices whose location was unknown if its location had 
been deliberately concealed.126 In the Netherlands if, subsequently, a device turns out to be in 
another jurisdiction, Dutch police must apply for Mutual Legal Assistance to continue. If the Dutch 
police are aware of where the server is located, then the law enforcement authorities are required 
to send a request for legal assistance to the country where the server is based. If the country does 
not respond to the request, then the Dutch police may hack the server.  The suggested amendment 
of the 2016 Act would align the UK with legislation in the Netherlands.  Such an amendment is 
important for public trust127 as well as for the effective operation of the 2016 Act. Whilst the 2016 
Act has improved clarity in relation to law enforcement hacking there is still very little publicly 
available information on the tools that UK law enforcement agencies use, as highlighted by the 
following National Crime Agency (NCA)’s statement:  
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the NCA leads the law enforcement response to serious and organised criminality impacting 
the UK. However, to preserve operational effectiveness we do not routinely disclose details 
of specific tools or techniques deployed in addressing those threats.128  
Greater transparency as to when equipment interference can be used to hack foreign located 
computers does not undermine the effectiveness of such techniques nor the safety of UK citizens 
but would make it clear to the public that such searches are proportionate and necessary and 
properly overseen.  The Code of Practice should also be amended to make it clear, just as the 
provisions in the Netherlands do, that once it is identified that a computer is located in a foreign 
jurisdiction mutual legal assistance channels would have to be used to further progress the 
investigation. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and Investigatory Powers Act 2016 have attempted 
to bring clarity to investigatory powers but also allowed these powers to be extended. This article 
has highlighted that undercover online policing and equipment interference are essential, although 
intrusive, police tactics in the fight against offending on the dark web.  The extent to which these 
tactics are needed in dark web investigations is not recognised in any of the Codes of Practice 
related to investigatory powers and this leads to a number of problems. The 2000 and 2016 Act 
clarify the law but not utilisation of the law. We know what LEA powers are but not how they are 
used. This article has highlighted areas for potential amendment to the Codes of Practice and to the 
2016 Act to ensure greater clarity and transparency. Such reform can only take place after 
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appropriate consultation and it is suggested this could begin by a review by the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner. The following issues are specifically raised: 
i) The extent to which CHIS and directed surveillance authorisations under the 2000 Act are used 
to authorise online covert surveillance should be publicly available. It is recommended that the 
IPCO annual report could break down the figures.  
ii) In a time where there is a ‘growth of online activity’ more effort needs to be made to effectively 
recognise the role of online surveillance in policy documents. The ongoing Undercover Policing 
Inquiry is ideally placed to deal with these issues. As a minimum there should be a nationally 
agreed definition of an undercover online officer and Codes of Practice should recognise the key 
issues which arise with effective online deployment. The Codes of Practice should provide 
greater acknowledgment of the specific safeguards which need to be in place when conducting 
online undercover surveillance. 
iii) The CHIS Codes of Practice or other guidance document should include discussion of the extent 
to which section 27 of the 2000 Act can be relied upon in undercover online operations which 
require an online persona to engage in activity which would otherwise be criminal, such as the 
posting of child exploitation material. This is particularly important in the context of CHIS and 
directed surveillance authorisations which only need to demonstrate that they are ‘for the 
purpose of preventing or detecting crime’ rather than the higher standard of serious crime.  
Whilst the 2000 Act sets out that CHIS and direct surveillance authorisations should be 
proportionate and necessary the Codes of Conduct give no consideration to this issue and 
therefore the extent to which UK LEAs engage in conduct such as that seen by Taskforce Argos 
in Operation Artemis is unknown and therefore lacks transparency.   
iv) Jurisdiction forum shopping should not be used by any UK LEA and this needs to be explicit in 
the Codes of Practice. It would not be justifiable for UK police to use Taskforce Argos, or any 
other overseas LEA, in the way the FBI seem to have done during Operation Artemis. To 
deliberately seek the help of police in another jurisdiction, not because the crime had links to 
that jurisdiction, but because police can use investigation tactics which are not available in the 
UK, would entirely circumvent investigatory powers in the UK and undoubtedly undermine 
confidence in UK policing. Whilst there is no evidence that any UK LEA has engaged or would 
engage in such conduct the current Undercover Policing inquiry has highlighted that this is a 
contentious area of policing which has scope to be misused and public trust is currently low. 
Explicit exclusion of this practice would not only help to clarify the position for LEAs but would 
offer an additional level of protection to defendants who wanted to challenge the practice in 
court. Whilst breach of the Code of Practice would not automatically result in a successful 
application to stay proceedings or a successful application to exclude evidence under section 78 
of PACE it would likely be considered by the courts as akin to a breach of the PACE Codes of 
Practice.  
v) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 should address the jurisdictional issues which can arise when 
applying for an equipment interference warrant in dark web cases where the location of the 
equipment to be searched is hidden and therefore unknown. The Act could clarify that 
equipment interference warrants can be issued despite the location of the device being 
unknown (and therefore potentially outside of the UK) if “the location of the device is concealed 
through technological means and there is evidence of a British Islands connection which justifies 
further investigation”.  The Code of Practice should also be amended to make it clear, just as the 
provisions in the Netherlands do, that once it is identified that a computer is located in a foreign 
jurisdiction mutual legal assistance channels would have to be used to further progress the 
investigation. 
 
In a 2014 report Europol called for law enforcement to build technical capabilities in order to 
support investigations into subjects using the dark web, in accordance with relevant legislation. The 
UK has responded to this call by not only increasing its capacity building and technical abilities but 
also in reforming the relevant legislation.129 It can no longer be said that the dark web is beyond the 
reach of LEAs in the UK and this is vital, particularly to the fight against child pornography and the 
expansion of illicit dark markets. Greater powers to monitor online suspects both through hacking 
and undercover surveillance were undoubtedly needed to ensure law enforcement can keep up with 
dark web offenders.  This article has demonstrated that much policing of crimes committed on the 
dark web takes the form of traditional policing adapted for the internet and the anonymity of the 
dark web. Most units will spend much of their time and resources analysing open source materials, 
following suspicious monetary transactions and attempting to follow leads generated from arrests or 
interceptions of illegal packages.  However, these techniques alone whilst valuable are not sufficient. 
Most large-scale successful take downs of child pornography forums and dark web marketplaces 
have utilised hacking or undercover surveillance to some extent and frequently deploy both. 
Historically, such covert monitoring was primarily within the domain of the intelligence agencies. 
The extent of offending on the dark web and the need for covert tactics to circumvent encryption 
has blurred the lines between intelligence agency power and police power and responsibility. As the 
use of the dark web by criminals expands so too will LEA reliance on investigatory powers. It is 
therefore more important than ever that we shine a light on this little understood corner of policing 
and ensure that officers have the training and legal framework required to operate effectively and 
the UK public can have confidence that such work is properly regulated and monitored. 
 
129 Although the legislation was prompted by defeats in the European Court of Human Rights 
